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ABSTRACT
This note presents the solution of a two-person poker
variant considered by Friedman [1]. The solution is derived
using a general algorithm proposed by the author to solve
two-person zero sum games with 'almost' perfect information
[2J .
1. Description of the Game
The following poker game is a slight generalization of
Friedman's "Simple Bluffing Situation with Possible Reraise"
[lJ . ' Player 1 has a low card up and one card down, Player 11
has a high ｣ ｡ ｲ ｾ up and one card down. If both players have
either a high or a low card down, then Player 11 wins; otherwise,
the player with the high card down wins. There are n units in
the pot. Player 1 may either drop or raise 1 unit. Then Player
11 may either drop, call or reraise (m-l) units. Finally, Player
1 may either drop or call (in Friedman's example n=l, m=4).
Let p and q be the respective probabilities that Player 1
o 0
and Player 11 have a high card down. Of course, each player
knows whether his own card down is high or low.
2. Computation of the Value of the Game
The solution will be derived using a general algorithm
proposed by the author to solve two person zero sum games with
'almost' perfect information[2J. For convenience we shall use
the same notation as in [2J.
Let the letters D) C, R stand for drop, call or raise
respectively and let m1E{D,R}, m2E{D,C,R}, m3E{D,C}. Let
Vffi l m2m3 be the value of the ml -m2-m3 restricted game; that is,
the game in which the players' choice sets are restricted to
the unique elements ml ,m2 ,ffi3 respectively. Then we have
(theorem 1 in [2})
k -2--
ym·l ID2 = Cav{Max VIDI ID 2ID3} ｾ
Or m3
yml = Vex Min{yIDI ID2} ,
Orr m2
and finally: V = Cav Max{yID1 }
Or ml
We shall make the computation stage by stage and represent
the functions on the unit square (0 ｾ p ｾ 1, 0 : q ｾ 1). rt will
turn out that all functions will be "rectangle wise" linear (of
the form apq+8P+Aq+6 on rectangles) so that only the values at the
extremal points of the rectangles need be cOIDputed.
For the computation of the optimal ｳ ｴ ｲ ｡ ｴ ･ ｧ ｩ ･ ｳ ｾ it will also
be helpful to keep track of how the Cav and Vex are constructed.
This will be done by labeling the corresponding vertices of the
rectangles. (For instance, for qE[0,(m+n+l)/(2ID+n)] ,yRR is a
convex cOIDbination of yRRD at p = 0 and yRRC at p = 1).
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3. Computation of the Optimal Behavioral Strategies
3.1 Player lIs first optimal move
For p E: [0, (ntl)/(nt2)] and q E: [O,n(mtntl)/(ntl) (2mtn)]
o 0
Step 1
It is easily seen that
with
,
Thus,
So that Player lIs optimal move may be written as follows
Player 1 Prob (mlIL) Prob (mlIH)
ml = D (tD/(l-Po) 0
ml = R (tR(l-PR)/(l-po) 1
For p
o
E:[(ntl)/(nt2), lJ and qoE:[O, n(ntm+l)/(n+l)(2m+n)]
V(po,qo) = VR(po,qo)
Hence Player 1 raises independently of his state.
,
For ｱ ｯ ｾ [0, n(n+mtl)/(n+l) (2m+n)]
V(po,qo) = VD(po,qo)
,
Hence Player 1 drops independently of his state.
-5-
3.2 Player II's optimal first move
Given that Player 1 raised, Player 11 may either drop, call
or reraise.
q £[0,n(m+n+l)/(n+l(2m+n)]
o
k=2
RV (PR,qo) =
with qo =
Step 1
Since Player 1 raised, we have PI = PRo It is easily
seen that we have two extremal Bayesian best responses for
Player 11.
k=l
R 1 RD 1 RRV· (PR, qo) = f3 DV (PR,O) + f3 RV (P R,(m+m+l)/(2m+n)) ,
with 13 1 0 1qo = + f3 R(m+n+l)/(2m+n)D
Thus 0, 1 (m+n+l) / (2m+n) , 1 q (2m+n)/(m+n+l), 81 1-131qD = qR = t3 R = =0 D R
yl Prob (m2 !L) Prob (m2 IH)
1m2 = D ＶｾＯＨＱＭｱｯＩ 0
1m2 = R ＶｾＨＱＭｱｾＩＯＨＱＭｱｯＩ 1
2 RC 2 RRf3 cV (PR,O) + f3 RV (PR,(m+n+l)/(2m+n)),
2 2f3 C 0 + t3 R(m+n+l)/(2m+n)
Thus qc = 0, ｱ ｾ = (m+n+l)/(2m+n), ｦ Ｓ ｾ = qo(2m+n)/(m+TI+l), ｦ Ｓ ｾ =
2 Prob (m2 IL ) Prob (m2 IH)y
-
OJ
m2 =
,., 8C/(1-qo) 0v
R 2 2m2 = t3 R(l-qR)/(l-qo) 1
(notice that ｱ ｾ = ｱｾ and ｦ Ｓ ｾ = ｦＳｾ so that the k index may be dropped).
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Step 2
We now have to find the convex combination of these two
Bayesian best responses which is in equilibrium with Player lIs
first move (that is, which makes him indifferent between bluffing
or not, if he has a low card).
The supporting hyperplane to V(p,qo) for PE[O,PRJ has for
equation:
Y = [n-qo(n+l)(2m+n)/(m+n+l)] (n+2)p/(n+l)
The hyperplanes associated with the two Bayesian best
responses are easily identified since yl is a Bayesian best
response for pE: CPR ,OJ and y2 for PE [0 ,PRJ Thus
Yl = n- qo(n+l)(2m+n)/(m+n+l),
Y2 = [1-qO(2m+n)/(m+n+l)] (n+2)p - 1
So that
. III = 1/(n+l)[}-qo(2m+n)/(m+n+l)], 112 = l-lll
Player ll's optimal strategy may be interpreted as follows:
- if he has a high hand, he reraises,
- otherwise, he reraises with probability SR(l-qR)/(l-qo)
or, given that he does not reraise, then he will drop
with probability lll' and call with probability 112.
For p c:[0,(n+l)/(n+2)] and q E[0,n(n+m+l)/(n+l)(2m+n)]
o 0
Step 1
Since Player 1 raised independently of his state, Pl = po.
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There is only one Bayesian best response for Player 11; it is
yl as described on page 6, thus it is Player ll's optimal first
move.
3.3 Player lIs optimal move
The procedure used in 3.2 may be repeated. We shall only
give the final result.
Fo r PoE: [0, (1.1 +1 ) I (n +2 )J
! I -IP1:?Yf'T' 1 Prob (m3 IL ) Prob (m3 IH)I
I
Irl3 = D 1 I (m-l)/(m+n+l),I
Fl 3 = C 0 (n+2)/(m+m+l)
For p
o
E:[(n+l)/(n+2),OJ
Player 1 Frob (m3 !L)
I Prob (m3 IH)I
I
.
[n3 = D 1.
, l-(n+l)/(m+n+l)pI
i 0
m3 C 0
I (n+l)/(m+n+l)p=
r
0
While the optimal strategies may appear complicated, the
description of the "story" of the game in terms of the graph
of conditional probabilities is quite simple. Here is such a
story for po£fo,n+ 2:J]" q E:[0,n(n+m+l)/(n+l)(2m+n)]L 1.1+ U 0
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Starting with probability distributions Po = ｾ and Po = ｾ
an observer to the'game could derive the following conditional
probabilities:
- Player 1 drops, he has a low card,
- Player 1 raises of n units, the probability that he has
n+l
a high card jumps from Po to n+2 ;
- Player 2 calls or drops, he has a low card,
- Player 2 raises of m units, the probability that he
m+n+lhas high cards jumps from qo to 2m+n
- Player 1 calls, he has a high card;
- Player 1 drops, the probability that he has a high card
falls from nn++1
2
to (m-l)(n+l)
m (n+2) .
This sequence of conditional probabilities and the knowledge
of Ｈ ｾ Ｑ Ｇ ｾ Ｒ Ｉ ｦ ｵ ｬ ｬ ｾ describe the optimal ｢ ･ ｨ ｡ ｶ ｯ ｲ ｩ ｡ ｬ ｳ ｴ ｾ ｡ ｴ ･ ｧ ｩ ･ ｳ .
Ordinarily the conditional probabilities would be sufficient,
except that here they do not completely specify Player II's
strategy
4. Some Comments on Computational Feasibility
The use of this algorithm for real poker is severely
limited by the fact that so far no numerical procedure is
available for the Cav and Vex operators in more than two
dimensions. Concavifications have to be carried out by hand
using "visual judgments". On the other hand, the number of
reraises and their amounts may be quite arbitary with no
further complications.
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